4 compared
Code & supply-chain security scanners compared
Static analysis and supply-chain security scanners, compared on focus, source, and setup.
Open in the interactive comparison tool| Field | Semgrep Static analysis platform and open-source CLI for finding bugs, security issues, secrets, dependency risk, and custom rule matches in code. Open dossier | Gitleaks Open-source secret scanner for finding passwords, API keys, tokens, and other credentials in git history, files, directories, and stdin. Open dossier | Grype Apache-2.0 vulnerability scanner from Anchore for container images, filesystems, archives, SBOMs, PURLs, and CPEs, with risk scoring, VEX filtering, and CI-friendly output. Open dossier | Kubescape Apache-2.0 CNCF-incubating Kubernetes security platform and CLI for scanning clusters, manifests, Helm charts, Kustomize projects, Git repositories, and container images for misconfigurations, compliance gaps, and vulnerabilities. Open dossier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trust | ||||
| Install risk | Review first | Review first | Review first | Review first |
| Notes | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ |
| Category | tools | tools | tools | tools |
| Source | source-backed | source-backed | source-backed | source-backed |
| Author | Semgrep | Gitleaks | Anchore | Kubescape |
| Added | 2026-06-03 | 2026-06-03 | 2026-06-04 | 2026-06-04 |
| Platforms | CLI | CLI | CLI | CLI |
| Source repo | — | — | — | — |
| Safety notes | ✓Semgrep findings are review signals, not proof that code is safe or unsafe. False positives and false negatives need human triage. Semgrep Community Edition has more limited analysis than the Semgrep AppSec Platform for security use cases, so high-risk release gates should account for that limitation. Custom rules can be noisy or overly broad. Test rules on representative code before enforcing them in CI, hooks, or agent-managed review workflows. Secrets and dependency findings can include sensitive values, package paths, or vulnerable code snippets, so reports and PR comments need careful handling. Do not let automated Semgrep results directly trigger production deploys, dependency upgrades, or irreversible changes without owner review. | ✓Gitleaks can scan git history and large directories, so scope scans intentionally and use baselines for noisy legacy repositories. Findings may include real active credentials; treat reports, CI logs, and exported SARIF or JSON artifacts as sensitive. The upstream README states Gitleaks is feature complete and future releases are expected to be security patches only. | ✓Grype parses container images, archives, filesystems, SBOMs, package identifiers, and vulnerability data; run it from trusted automation with bounded filesystem access and resource limits for untrusted targets. The install script and binary update paths should be verified before use in production CI; pin versions and checksums where reproducible builds or regulated environments require it. Scanning private images can use registry credentials, client certificates, tokens, Docker or Podman daemon access, and local image metadata, so CI jobs should scope credentials and avoid broad registry permissions. Vulnerability findings are advisory and depend on package detection, vulnerability database freshness, distro context, CPE matching, fix-state metadata, EPSS, KEV, and risk-scoring inputs; high-impact findings still need human triage. Fail-on thresholds, only-fixed filters, only-notfixed filters, ignore rules, VEX documents, and suppressed-result settings can change pipeline outcomes, so policy changes should be reviewed like security code. The configuration reference includes options for insecure registry TLS behavior and HTTP registry access; these should be avoided outside tightly controlled test environments. Automatic database updates and application update checks make outbound network requests unless disabled or pinned by policy. Large images, archives, monorepos, or SBOMs can produce expensive scans and large JSON/SARIF artifacts; set timeouts, artifact limits, cache policy, and retention rules in CI. | ✓Cluster scans use kubeconfig and Kubernetes API access; run Kubescape with the narrowest practical permissions and avoid broad production credentials in untrusted automation. Manifest and repository scans can reveal sensitive workload structure, names, images, RBAC bindings, network policy gaps, and security posture; treat reports as security-sensitive evidence. Auto-fix commands can modify Kubernetes manifests, so use dry-run output, review diffs, and keep version-controlled rollback paths before applying generated changes. Image patching can require BuildKit and elevated local privileges, and the push option can publish patched images back to a registry; test tags and registry scope before enabling it. Validating Admission Policy generation and Deny bindings can block deploys cluster-wide if policy scope, namespace selectors, or control IDs are wrong. Exceptions, suppressed findings, severity thresholds, compliance thresholds, and baseline configuration can hide meaningful risk when used without review. Image scanning and vulnerability matching depend on image access, vulnerability database freshness, package detection, distro context, and Grype database behavior; high-impact results still need human triage. The MCP server exposes vulnerability and configuration scan data to AI assistants using the same Kubernetes access context, so connect it only to trusted clients and service accounts. |
| Privacy notes | ✓Semgrep scans source code, file paths, dependency manifests, lockfiles, comments, generated code, and rule matches in the selected project scope. The upstream README says Semgrep analyzes code locally by default and code is not uploaded, while platform workflows send findings for triage and reporting. Findings, SARIF, JSON output, CI logs, dashboard records, and PR comments can include file paths, code snippets, dependency names, rule IDs, and suspected secrets. Docker-based scans mount local source directories into the Semgrep container, so review volume paths and CI workspace scope before scanning private repositories. Logged-in platform scans, Semgrep Assistant, managed scans, and organization policies create additional hosted data and access-control considerations. | ✓Scans inspect repository contents, file contents, commit metadata, and streamed input for credential-like strings. Report files and verbose logs can contain secret values unless redaction and artifact retention are configured carefully. CI integrations may expose findings to workflow logs, code-scanning systems, or third-party build infrastructure. | ✓The Grype getting-started docs say Grype runs locally and does not send scan data to external services; it needs internet access for downloading container images and the vulnerability database. Pulling images from remote or private registries can disclose image names, tags, digests, registry hostnames, platform requests, authentication attempts, and network metadata to registry infrastructure. Scan output can reveal package names, package versions, ecosystems, distro names, image identifiers, file metadata, file digests, executable metadata, vulnerability identifiers, fix versions, EPSS, KEV, risk scores, and suppressed findings. JSON, SARIF, CycloneDX, and template outputs are useful for automation but can leak dependency inventory and security posture when uploaded to CI logs, code scanning tools, tickets, dashboards, or long-retention artifacts. Configuration files and environment variables can include registry usernames, passwords, tokens, client certificates, client keys, CA certificates, cache paths, update URLs, ignore rules, VEX documents, and output paths. SBOM inputs may contain full dependency inventories and build metadata; treat Grype reports and source SBOMs as security-sensitive artifacts. | ✓Kubescape reports can include cluster names, namespaces, workload names, RBAC subjects, users with administrative rights, image names, tags, digests, CVEs, control failures, file paths, and compliance scores. Pulling private images or scanning registries can disclose image references, registry hosts, authentication attempts, platform requests, and network metadata to registry infrastructure. CLI configuration can include account IDs, access keys, backend URLs, kubeconfig paths, registry usernames, registry passwords, output paths, cache directories, and exception files. SaaS submission, backend discovery, operator telemetry, Prometheus export, code-scanning uploads, and CI artifacts can move scan metadata outside the local machine or cluster when enabled. SARIF, JSON, JUnit, HTML, PDF, Prometheus, and MCP outputs can expose detailed security posture and should have retention, access control, and redaction policies. The Kubescape MCP server can make vulnerability manifests and configuration scan results available to AI tools, which may have their own logging, retention, and data-handling behavior. |
| Prerequisites |
|
|
|
|
| Install | — | — | — | — |
| Config | — | — | — | — |
| Citations | ||||
| Claim | Unclaimed | Unclaimed | Unclaimed | Unclaimed |
More comparisons, weekly
A short, calm digest of reviewed Claude resources. Unsubscribe any time.