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agentsSource-backed

Claude Code Auto Mode Policy Auditor Agent

A reusable agent prompt that reviews a Claude Code auto mode setup: whether autoMode.environment trusts the right repos, buckets, and domains, how the allow, soft_deny, and hard_deny tiers resolve, and whether $defaults is kept across settings scopes.

by JPette1783·added 2026-06-05·
Review first review before installing

Open the source and read safety notes before installing.

Citation facts

Source-backed facts for citing this resource, derived directly from the registry — also available as plain text for AI assistants.

Source URLs
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/auto-mode-config, https://github.com/JSONbored/awesome-claude/blob/main/content/agents/claude-code-auto-mode-policy-auditor-agent.mdx
Safety notes
This agent audits classifier policy; it is a second gate after the permissions system and does not replace permissions.deny for hard blocks., Critical: setting environment, allow, soft_deny, or hard_deny without the $defaults sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, discarding default protections like force-push and curl-to-shell blocks., allow rules can override soft_deny inside the classifier, so review additive developer entries that could widen policy.
Privacy notes
The environment list defines what counts as external; incomplete entries can cause the classifier to treat internal destinations as exfiltration or vice versa., The classifier reads CLAUDE.md, which can contain project context; keep secrets out of it., autoMode is not read from shared project settings, so a checked-in repo cannot inject allow rules; confirm rules come from intended scopes.
Author
JPette1783
Submitted by
JPette1783
Claim status
unclaimed
Last verified
2026-06-05

Decision playbook

Review trust signals before you adopt

Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.

Compare context
Selected

0

Current score

63

Baseline

Delta

No baseline selected

No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.

Source and provenance checks

Needs review

Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.

  • Source link availableRequired

    Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.

    Done
  • Source provenance statusRequired

    Marked as source-backed.

    Done
  • Metadata reviewed

    No reviewed flag detected in metadata.

    Pending

Safety and privacy checks

Complete

Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.

  • Safety notes presentRequired

    Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.

    Done
  • Privacy notes presentRequired

    Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.

    Done
  • Trust level risk gateRequired

    Trust level does not block evaluation.

    Done

Package and install checks

Needs review

Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.

  • Install payload available

    Install or copy payload is available for review.

    Done
  • Package verification flag

    No package verification flag provided.

    Pending
  • Checksum metadata

    No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.

    Pending

Compare-driven decision checks

Needs review

Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.

  • Compare tray has multiple entries

    Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.

    Pending
  • Baseline comparison available

    No baseline peer selected yet.

    Pending
  • Diverging trust signals identified

    No major trust-signal divergence found.

    Pending

Setup at a glance

Copy & paste

Copy-ready — paste the snippet to get started.

Adoption plan

Balanced adoption plan

Current risk score 24/100. Use staged verification before broader rollout.

Risk 24

Pre-adoption checks

Validate source and review signals before any execution.

  • Confirm source provenanceRequired

    Source URL/provenance metadata is present.

    Done
  • Confirm metadata review state

    No review metadata found; increase manual validation.

    Pending
  • Verify install payload

    Install/config payload exists and can be inspected.

    Done

Security checks

Confirm safety, privacy, and package integrity signals.

  • Review safety notesRequired

    Safety notes are present.

    Done
  • Review privacy notesRequired

    Privacy notes are present.

    Done
  • Verify package integrity metadata

    No package verification/checksum metadata.

    Pending

Rollout

Adopt in controlled steps based on the selected plan.

  • Run in isolated sandbox firstRequired

    Use a constrained sandbox and observe behavior across multiple tasks.

    Pending
  • Roll out graduallyRequired

    Roll out to a small cohort before wider usage.

    Pending
  • Set monitoring and fallback

    Define rollback path and monitor errors after adoption.

    Pending

Evidence readiness

Evidence readiness matrix · balanced

Missing required evidence: Metadata review. Risk score 31.

Risk 31

Source provenance

Present

Source repository/provenance is listed.

Required in this preset

Metadata review

Missing

Review metadata is missing.

Required in this preset

Safety notes

Present

Safety notes are present.

Required in this preset

Privacy notes

Present

Privacy notes are present.

Optional in this preset

Package integrity

Missing

Package integrity metadata is missing.

Optional in this preset

Install payload

Present

Install payload is available.

Required in this preset

Required gaps: Metadata review

Decision timeline

Decision timeline · balanced

Blocking gaps: Check metadata review status. Risk 28.

Risk 28

triage

Confirm source provenanceRequired

Source/provenance metadata is available.

Done

triage

Check metadata review statusRequired

Review metadata is missing.

Pending

verify

Review safety notesRequired

Safety notes are available.

Done

verify

Review privacy notes

Privacy notes are available.

Done

verify

Validate package integrity metadata

Package integrity metadata is missing.

Pending

rollout

Verify install payload and commandsRequired

Install payload is available.

Done

Blockers: Check metadata review status

Prerequisite readiness

Prerequisite readiness

3 prerequisites to line up before setup.

0/3 ready
Install & runtime1Configuration1General1

Safety & privacy surface

Safety & privacy surface

3 safety and 3 privacy notes across 4 risk areas. Review closely: credentials & tokens, permissions & scopes.

4 areas
  • SafetyPermissions & scopesThis agent audits classifier policy; it is a second gate after the permissions system and does not replace permissions.deny for hard blocks.
  • SafetyExecution & processesCritical: setting environment, allow, soft_deny, or hard_deny without the $defaults sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, discarding default protections like force-push and curl-to-shell blocks.
  • SafetyGeneralallow rules can override soft_deny inside the classifier, so review additive developer entries that could widen policy.
  • PrivacyGeneralThe environment list defines what counts as external; incomplete entries can cause the classifier to treat internal destinations as exfiltration or vice versa.
  • PrivacyCredentials & tokensThe classifier reads CLAUDE.md, which can contain project context; keep secrets out of it.
  • PrivacyPermissions & scopesautoMode is not read from shared project settings, so a checked-in repo cannot inject allow rules; confirm rules come from intended scopes.

Safety notes

  • This agent audits classifier policy; it is a second gate after the permissions system and does not replace permissions.deny for hard blocks.
  • Critical: setting environment, allow, soft_deny, or hard_deny without the $defaults sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, discarding default protections like force-push and curl-to-shell blocks.
  • allow rules can override soft_deny inside the classifier, so review additive developer entries that could widen policy.

Privacy notes

  • The environment list defines what counts as external; incomplete entries can cause the classifier to treat internal destinations as exfiltration or vice versa.
  • The classifier reads CLAUDE.md, which can contain project context; keep secrets out of it.
  • autoMode is not read from shared project settings, so a checked-in repo cannot inject allow rules; confirm rules come from intended scopes.

Prerequisites

  • A Claude Code setup using auto mode, with access to the autoMode settings block and relevant CLAUDE.md.
  • Knowledge of your organization's trusted repos, buckets, domains, and services.
  • Ability to run the auto-mode CLI subcommands to inspect effective configuration.

Schema details

Install type
copy
Troubleshooting
No
Full copyable content
## Content

Claude Code Auto Mode Policy Auditor Agent is a reusable agent prompt for auditing
how auto mode is configured. Auto mode routes each tool call through a classifier
that blocks irreversible, destructive, or externally aimed actions; this agent
reviews the trusted environment list and the allow, soft_deny, and hard_deny
rules so the classifier blocks the right things without discarding defaults.

Use it when enabling auto mode for a team or when the classifier is producing too
many false positives or, worse, allowing risky actions.

## Agent Prompt

You are an auto mode policy auditor for Claude Code. Review the classifier
configuration so it trusts the right internal infrastructure and keeps the right
blocks. Use the official auto mode configuration documentation as your reference.

Audit workflow:

1. Layering. Confirm auto mode is understood as a second gate after the
   permissions system; actions that must never run belong in permissions.deny in
   managed settings, not only in classifier rules.
2. Environment. Review `autoMode.environment`. Confirm it describes trusted repos,
   buckets, domains, and services so routine internal operations are not treated
   as exfiltration.
3. $defaults sentinel. Critically check that `environment`, `allow`, `soft_deny`,
   and `hard_deny` include `$defaults` unless full ownership is intended. Without
   it, the entire built-in list is replaced and default protections are lost.
4. Precedence. Confirm understanding that hard_deny is unconditional, soft_deny
   can be cleared by explicit user intent or allow, and allow overrides matching
   soft_deny.
5. Scope. Confirm rules come from intended scopes (user, local, managed); note the
   classifier does not read autoMode from shared project settings.
6. Inspect. Recommend running the auto-mode subcommands to print defaults, view
   the effective config, and critique custom rules.
7. Decision. Policy sound, tighten, or fix $defaults handling.

Output contract:

- Policy summary: environment, allow/soft_deny/hard_deny, scopes.
- Findings: missing $defaults, gaps in environment, over-broad allow rules,
  reliance on classifier for hard blocks.
- Required changes: restore $defaults, add trusted infra, move hard blocks to
  permissions.deny.
- Decision and verification via the auto-mode subcommands.

## Features

- Audits the autoMode environment and rule lists against intent.
- Catches the critical $defaults omission that discards built-in protections.
- Explains classifier precedence (hard_deny, soft_deny, allow, user intent).
- Recommends moving must-never-run actions to permissions.deny.

## Use Cases

- Enable auto mode for a team with trusted internal infrastructure.
- Reduce classifier false positives for routine internal operations.
- Catch a settings change that discarded default block rules.
- Verify effective auto mode config with the CLI subcommands.

## Source Notes

- Auto mode routes tool calls through a classifier configured by the `autoMode`
  block (environment, allow, soft_deny, hard_deny), read from user, local,
  managed, or inline scopes but not shared project settings.
- Omitting the `$defaults` sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, and the
  classifier is a second gate after the permissions system, so permissions.deny is
  the place for unconditional hard blocks.

## Duplicate Check

The content tree and open PRs were checked for auto mode, classifier, and policy
audit agents. No auto mode policy auditor exists. This entry is distinct: it is an
`agents` prompt focused on auditing Claude Code auto mode classifier configuration.

## Editorial Disclosure

Submitted as an independent community agent entry by `JPette1783`, based on
public Claude Code documentation. No paid placement, referral, or affiliate
relationship.

## Sources

- Claude Code auto mode configuration docs: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/auto-mode-config
- Claude Code skills documentation: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/skills
- Claude Code features overview: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/features-overview

About this resource

Content

Claude Code Auto Mode Policy Auditor Agent is a reusable agent prompt for auditing how auto mode is configured. Auto mode routes each tool call through a classifier that blocks irreversible, destructive, or externally aimed actions; this agent reviews the trusted environment list and the allow, soft_deny, and hard_deny rules so the classifier blocks the right things without discarding defaults.

Use it when enabling auto mode for a team or when the classifier is producing too many false positives or, worse, allowing risky actions.

Agent Prompt

You are an auto mode policy auditor for Claude Code. Review the classifier configuration so it trusts the right internal infrastructure and keeps the right blocks. Use the official auto mode configuration documentation as your reference.

Audit workflow:

  1. Layering. Confirm auto mode is understood as a second gate after the permissions system; actions that must never run belong in permissions.deny in managed settings, not only in classifier rules.
  2. Environment. Review autoMode.environment. Confirm it describes trusted repos, buckets, domains, and services so routine internal operations are not treated as exfiltration.
  3. $defaults sentinel. Critically check that environment, allow, soft_deny, and hard_deny include $defaults unless full ownership is intended. Without it, the entire built-in list is replaced and default protections are lost.
  4. Precedence. Confirm understanding that hard_deny is unconditional, soft_deny can be cleared by explicit user intent or allow, and allow overrides matching soft_deny.
  5. Scope. Confirm rules come from intended scopes (user, local, managed); note the classifier does not read autoMode from shared project settings.
  6. Inspect. Recommend running the auto-mode subcommands to print defaults, view the effective config, and critique custom rules.
  7. Decision. Policy sound, tighten, or fix $defaults handling.

Output contract:

  • Policy summary: environment, allow/soft_deny/hard_deny, scopes.
  • Findings: missing $defaults, gaps in environment, over-broad allow rules, reliance on classifier for hard blocks.
  • Required changes: restore $defaults, add trusted infra, move hard blocks to permissions.deny.
  • Decision and verification via the auto-mode subcommands.

Features

  • Audits the autoMode environment and rule lists against intent.
  • Catches the critical $defaults omission that discards built-in protections.
  • Explains classifier precedence (hard_deny, soft_deny, allow, user intent).
  • Recommends moving must-never-run actions to permissions.deny.

Use Cases

  • Enable auto mode for a team with trusted internal infrastructure.
  • Reduce classifier false positives for routine internal operations.
  • Catch a settings change that discarded default block rules.
  • Verify effective auto mode config with the CLI subcommands.

Source Notes

  • Auto mode routes tool calls through a classifier configured by the autoMode block (environment, allow, soft_deny, hard_deny), read from user, local, managed, or inline scopes but not shared project settings.
  • Omitting the $defaults sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, and the classifier is a second gate after the permissions system, so permissions.deny is the place for unconditional hard blocks.

Duplicate Check

The content tree and open PRs were checked for auto mode, classifier, and policy audit agents. No auto mode policy auditor exists. This entry is distinct: it is an agents prompt focused on auditing Claude Code auto mode classifier configuration.

Editorial Disclosure

Submitted as an independent community agent entry by JPette1783, based on public Claude Code documentation. No paid placement, referral, or affiliate relationship.

Sources

Source citations

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How it compares

Claude Code Auto Mode Policy Auditor Agent side by side with 2 alternatives on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.

2 trust signals differ across this comparison (Source provenance, Submitter).

Field

A reusable agent prompt that reviews a Claude Code auto mode setup: whether autoMode.environment trusts the right repos, buckets, and domains, how the allow, soft_deny, and hard_deny tiers resolve, and whether $defaults is kept across settings scopes.

Open dossier

Community reusable agent prompt for reviewing new MCP server adoption in Claude Code using official security documentation: trusted providers, permissions configuration, trust verification, and settings checked into source control.

Open dossier

Source-backed agent that reviews active Claude Code sessions and configuration for security gaps, cross-references the official security guidance, and produces a ranked remediation plan covering permissions, MCP trust, prompt injection, credential handling, and hook safety.

Open dossier
Next steps
Trust
Review statusNot reviewedNot reviewedNot reviewed
Package trustPackage not verifiedPackage not verifiedPackage not verified
Source provenanceDiffersSource-backedSubmission linkedSource submissionSource-backed
SubmitterDiffersJPette1783kiannidevjaso0n0818
Install riskReview firstReview firstReview first
Notes Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ Safety ✓ Privacy ✓
Brand
Categoryagentsagentsagents
SourceSource-backedSource-backedSource-backed
AuthorJPette1783kiannidevjaso0n0818
Added2026-06-052026-06-162026-06-15
Platforms
Harness
Source repo
Safety notesThis agent audits classifier policy; it is a second gate after the permissions system and does not replace permissions.deny for hard blocks. Critical: setting environment, allow, soft_deny, or hard_deny without the $defaults sentinel replaces the entire built-in list, discarding default protections like force-push and curl-to-shell blocks. allow rules can override soft_deny inside the classifier, so review additive developer entries that could widen policy.Anthropic reviews directory connectors but does not security-audit third-party MCP servers per official docs. This prompt applies documented Claude Code guidance; it is not a penetration test. Prefer writing or vetting your own MCP servers when handling sensitive repositories. Trust verification applies to new MCP servers—do not bypass in non-interactive modes without policy review.This agent reads configuration and assesses risk; it does not modify settings, revoke permissions, or disconnect MCP servers. Remediation steps that involve disconnecting MCP servers or changing hook scripts must be reviewed by a human before applying. Hook commands execute on the host with full user permissions; flag any hook that is not read-only or that pulls external content at runtime. Managed-settings changes affect all team members; escalate those remediations to an administrator.
Privacy notesThe environment list defines what counts as external; incomplete entries can cause the classifier to treat internal destinations as exfiltration or vice versa. The classifier reads CLAUDE.md, which can contain project context; keep secrets out of it. autoMode is not read from shared project settings, so a checked-in repo cannot inject allow rules; confirm rules come from intended scopes.MCP settings checked into source control may expose internal server names and endpoints. Audit summaries should not paste secrets from server configuration files. Third-party MCP tools may send repository context externally—note data residency in reviews.CLAUDE.md and settings files may contain internal project details, API endpoint patterns, or policy rules; treat audit output as internal. MCP server configurations may expose credential references or internal service URLs; do not log or share audit reports outside the team. If the audit runs in a shared or CI environment, ensure the session transcript is not persisted where it can be read by unintended parties.
Prerequisites
  • A Claude Code setup using auto mode, with access to the autoMode settings block and relevant CLAUDE.md.
  • Knowledge of your organization's trusted repos, buckets, domains, and services.
  • Ability to run the auto-mode CLI subcommands to inspect effective configuration.
  • Draft MCP server entry for Claude Code settings or managed configuration.
  • Provider identity and whether the server is first-party, directory-listed, or third-party.
  • Team policy for MCP permissions and version-controlled settings files.
  • Inventory of tools exposed by the server if available from the provider.
  • Access to the CLAUDE.md, .claude/settings.json, and .mcp.json for the project being audited.
  • The list of connected MCP servers and their transports (stdio vs HTTP/SSE).
  • Knowledge of which hooks are registered and what shell commands they execute.
  • Claude Code 1.x or later (settings schema and managed-settings support required).
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