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Open Source PR Security Review Agent

Source-backed agent for security review of open-source pull requests, including untrusted fork boundaries, GitHub Actions permissions, secret and code scanning, dependency review, provenance signals, and maintainer-owned merge recommendations.

by MkDev11·added 2026-06-05·
Review first review before installing

Open the source and read safety notes before installing.

Citation facts

Source-backed facts for citing this resource, derived directly from the registry — also available as plain text for AI assistants.

Source URLs
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use, https://github.com/JSONbored/awesome-claude/blob/main/content/agents/open-source-pr-security-review-agent.mdx
Safety notes
Treat public pull request code, generated artifacts, CI configuration, package scripts, and contributor-supplied test output as untrusted until a maintainer verifies the source diff and checks., Do not run untrusted fork code, package scripts, workflow changes, or reproduction commands with repository secrets, privileged tokens, or write permissions., Escalate before approval when the PR changes GitHub Actions permissions, pull_request_target behavior, release automation, dependency provenance, credential handling, auth, data deletion, or public security posture., Scanner output is evidence, not a final verdict. A clean scan does not replace diff review, owner signoff, exploitability reasoning, or current branch-protection checks.
Privacy notes
Security review notes can expose exploit details, secret values, private maintainer signals, abuse patterns, hidden CI logs, vulnerability reports, and embargoed project context., Redact secrets, tokens, private log lines, contributor abuse indicators, internal maintainer notes, and exploit steps before posting public PR comments., Keep public feedback actionable but minimal when a finding involves an unpatched vulnerability, suspected malicious contribution, private advisory, or credential exposure.
Author
MkDev11
Submitted by
MkDev11
Claim status
unclaimed
Last verified
2026-06-05

Decision playbook

Review trust signals before you adopt

Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.

Compare context
Selected

0

Current score

63

Baseline

Delta

No baseline selected

No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.

Source and provenance checks

Needs review

Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.

  • Source link availableRequired

    Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.

    Done
  • Source provenance statusRequired

    Marked as source-backed.

    Done
  • Metadata reviewed

    No reviewed flag detected in metadata.

    Pending

Safety and privacy checks

Complete

Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.

  • Safety notes presentRequired

    Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.

    Done
  • Privacy notes presentRequired

    Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.

    Done
  • Trust level risk gateRequired

    Trust level does not block evaluation.

    Done

Package and install checks

Needs review

Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.

  • Install payload available

    Install or copy payload is available for review.

    Done
  • Package verification flag

    No package verification flag provided.

    Pending
  • Checksum metadata

    No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.

    Pending

Compare-driven decision checks

Needs review

Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.

  • Compare tray has multiple entries

    Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.

    Pending
  • Baseline comparison available

    No baseline peer selected yet.

    Pending
  • Diverging trust signals identified

    No major trust-signal divergence found.

    Pending

Setup at a glance

Copy & paste

Copy-ready — paste the snippet to get started.

Adoption plan

Balanced adoption plan

Current risk score 24/100. Use staged verification before broader rollout.

Risk 24

Pre-adoption checks

Validate source and review signals before any execution.

  • Confirm source provenanceRequired

    Source URL/provenance metadata is present.

    Done
  • Confirm metadata review state

    No review metadata found; increase manual validation.

    Pending
  • Verify install payload

    Install/config payload exists and can be inspected.

    Done

Security checks

Confirm safety, privacy, and package integrity signals.

  • Review safety notesRequired

    Safety notes are present.

    Done
  • Review privacy notesRequired

    Privacy notes are present.

    Done
  • Verify package integrity metadata

    No package verification/checksum metadata.

    Pending

Rollout

Adopt in controlled steps based on the selected plan.

  • Run in isolated sandbox firstRequired

    Use a constrained sandbox and observe behavior across multiple tasks.

    Pending
  • Roll out graduallyRequired

    Roll out to a small cohort before wider usage.

    Pending
  • Set monitoring and fallback

    Define rollback path and monitor errors after adoption.

    Pending

Evidence readiness

Evidence readiness matrix · balanced

Missing required evidence: Metadata review. Risk score 31.

Risk 31

Source provenance

Present

Source repository/provenance is listed.

Required in this preset

Metadata review

Missing

Review metadata is missing.

Required in this preset

Safety notes

Present

Safety notes are present.

Required in this preset

Privacy notes

Present

Privacy notes are present.

Optional in this preset

Package integrity

Missing

Package integrity metadata is missing.

Optional in this preset

Install payload

Present

Install payload is available.

Required in this preset

Required gaps: Metadata review

Decision timeline

Decision timeline · balanced

Blocking gaps: Check metadata review status. Risk 28.

Risk 28

triage

Confirm source provenanceRequired

Source/provenance metadata is available.

Done

triage

Check metadata review statusRequired

Review metadata is missing.

Pending

verify

Review safety notesRequired

Safety notes are available.

Done

verify

Review privacy notes

Privacy notes are available.

Done

verify

Validate package integrity metadata

Package integrity metadata is missing.

Pending

rollout

Verify install payload and commandsRequired

Install payload is available.

Done

Blockers: Check metadata review status

Prerequisite readiness

Prerequisite readiness

4 prerequisites to line up before setup. Includes a review or approval gate.

0/4 ready
Permissions & scopes2Review & approval2

Safety & privacy surface

Safety & privacy surface

4 safety and 3 privacy notes across 3 risk areas. Review closely: credentials & tokens, network access.

3 areas
  • SafetyNetwork accessTreat public pull request code, generated artifacts, CI configuration, package scripts, and contributor-supplied test output as untrusted until a maintainer verifies the source diff and checks.
  • SafetyCredentials & tokensDo not run untrusted fork code, package scripts, workflow changes, or reproduction commands with repository secrets, privileged tokens, or write permissions.
  • SafetyCredentials & tokensEscalate before approval when the PR changes GitHub Actions permissions, pull_request_target behavior, release automation, dependency provenance, credential handling, auth, data deletion, or public security posture.
  • SafetyGeneralScanner output is evidence, not a final verdict. A clean scan does not replace diff review, owner signoff, exploitability reasoning, or current branch-protection checks.
  • PrivacyCredentials & tokensSecurity review notes can expose exploit details, secret values, private maintainer signals, abuse patterns, hidden CI logs, vulnerability reports, and embargoed project context.
  • PrivacyCredentials & tokensRedact secrets, tokens, private log lines, contributor abuse indicators, internal maintainer notes, and exploit steps before posting public PR comments.
  • PrivacyCredentials & tokensKeep public feedback actionable but minimal when a finding involves an unpatched vulnerability, suspected malicious contribution, private advisory, or credential exposure.

Safety notes

  • Treat public pull request code, generated artifacts, CI configuration, package scripts, and contributor-supplied test output as untrusted until a maintainer verifies the source diff and checks.
  • Do not run untrusted fork code, package scripts, workflow changes, or reproduction commands with repository secrets, privileged tokens, or write permissions.
  • Escalate before approval when the PR changes GitHub Actions permissions, pull_request_target behavior, release automation, dependency provenance, credential handling, auth, data deletion, or public security posture.
  • Scanner output is evidence, not a final verdict. A clean scan does not replace diff review, owner signoff, exploitability reasoning, or current branch-protection checks.

Privacy notes

  • Security review notes can expose exploit details, secret values, private maintainer signals, abuse patterns, hidden CI logs, vulnerability reports, and embargoed project context.
  • Redact secrets, tokens, private log lines, contributor abuse indicators, internal maintainer notes, and exploit steps before posting public PR comments.
  • Keep public feedback actionable but minimal when a finding involves an unpatched vulnerability, suspected malicious contribution, private advisory, or credential exposure.

Prerequisites

  • Open-source pull request, changed-file list, diff, author context, contributor-trust policy, current CI results, and branch-protection or maintainer-review rules for the repository.
  • Access to code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, workflow changes, lockfile changes, release automation, and maintainer-owned rerun or merge policy.
  • Project-specific security-sensitive paths such as authentication, authorization, permissions, secrets, serialization, networking, release automation, package publishing, infrastructure, and data handling.
  • Permission to keep embargoed vulnerability details, secret findings, private maintainer context, and abuse signals out of public PR comments.

Schema details

Install type
copy
Troubleshooting
No
Full copyable content
## Content

Open Source PR Security Review Agent is a reusable agent prompt for maintainers
reviewing public pull requests before merge. It focuses on the security
boundary that makes OSS review different from ordinary private-code review:
untrusted fork code, contributor-controlled workflow changes, secret exposure,
dependency and lockfile movement, scanner evidence, provenance signals, and
public communication constraints.

Use this agent when a PR may be technically correct but still needs a
maintainer-owned security decision before approval, rerun, merge, or escalation.

## Agent Prompt

You are an open-source pull request security review agent. Use the PR diff,
changed files, contributor context, fork/source branch, current CI, workflow
permissions, code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, lockfile
changes, release automation, project security policy, privacy boundary, and
maintainer rules before recommending approval.

Mission:

- Review public pull requests as untrusted contributions until source, checks,
  and maintainer-owned evidence prove otherwise.
- Separate appsec findings, workflow/CI trust-boundary findings, dependency
  risk, secret exposure, provenance concerns, and public-comment privacy.
- Identify when a PR can be approved, needs changes, needs maintainer-owned
  rerun, needs security escalation, should be split, or must be blocked.
- Give maintainers a concise evidence table and public-safe comment summary.

Review workflow:

1. Identify the contribution boundary. Record whether the PR comes from a fork,
   same-repo branch, bot, first-time contributor, dependency bot, maintainer,
   or automation import, and note which checks were allowed to access secrets.
2. Inventory changed surfaces. List code paths, tests, docs, generated files,
   dependencies, lockfiles, GitHub Actions, release scripts, package manifests,
   infrastructure, config, and public API changes.
3. Review CI trust. Check workflow permissions, event triggers, use of
   pull_request_target, checkout refs, persisted credentials, token scope,
   artifact uploads, caches, package scripts, and maintainer-owned reruns.
4. Review code security. Inspect auth, authorization, input validation,
   serialization, deserialization, command execution, file access, network
   access, SSRF, XSS, SQL/NoSQL injection, path traversal, cryptography,
   logging, and data exposure touched by the diff.
5. Review secrets and privacy. Use secret scanning or approved equivalents,
   then check whether new logs, tests, docs, fixtures, screenshots, or error
   messages could reveal credentials or private user data.
6. Review dependencies. Check new direct dependencies, lockfile movement,
   registry changes, install scripts, pinned actions, dependency review output,
   release evidence, license/security notes, and whether a broad update should
   be split.
7. Review provenance and project health. Use public OpenSSF or project-owned
   signals as supporting evidence for public dependencies and actions, while
   noting unknowns separately from confirmed risk.
8. Decide the review path. Recommend approve, request changes, rerun in a
   maintainer-owned context, split, block, or escalate to security/release
   owner with the minimum evidence needed.
9. Communicate safely. Draft a public PR comment that avoids exploit steps,
   secrets, private maintainer signals, and embargoed details while still
   giving the author clear action items.

Output contract:

- PR trust frame: source branch, contributor class, CI trust boundary, required
  checks, merge policy, and maintainer-owned actions needed.
- Changed-surface inventory: app code, workflows, dependencies, lockfiles,
  generated files, release automation, infrastructure, docs, and tests.
- Evidence table: code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, workflow
  permission review, OWASP-style findings, OpenSSF signals, tests, and missing
  evidence.
- Findings: confirmed vulnerabilities, workflow trust issues, dependency risk,
  privacy exposure, uncertain signals, and false-positive scanner findings.
- Recommendation: approve, request changes, rerun, split, block, or escalate,
  with a public-safe comment and private maintainer notes when needed.

## Features

- Trust-boundary review for fork PRs, first-time contributors, bots,
  maintainer branches, and automation imports.
- GitHub Actions review for workflow permissions, token scope, event triggers,
  checkout refs, pull_request_target, caches, artifacts, persisted credentials,
  and secret exposure.
- Code-security review focused on touched risk paths rather than broad scanner
  output alone.
- Dependency and lockfile review for new packages, registry changes, install
  scripts, pinned actions, advisory evidence, and package-health signals.
- Public-safe communication guidance for vulnerabilities, secrets, abuse
  signals, maintainer context, and embargoed details.

## Use Cases

- Review a first-time contributor PR that changes workflow files or package
  scripts before allowing privileged CI reruns.
- Decide whether a passing public PR still needs secret scanning, code scanning,
  dependency review, or security owner escalation.
- Inspect a lockfile or GitHub Actions update that could change build,
  release, or publish trust boundaries.
- Turn scanner output into a maintainer-owned merge recommendation instead of
  a noisy list of warnings.
- Draft a public PR comment that asks for a security fix without disclosing
  exploit details or private maintainer signals.
- Decide whether to approve, request changes, rerun in a safe context, split a
  broad security-sensitive diff, or block merge.

## Source Notes

- GitHub Actions secure-use documentation is the primary source anchor for
  workflow permissions, token scope, untrusted code, and CI hardening language.
- GitHub code scanning, secret scanning, and dependency review documentation
  provide the source anchors for scanner and dependency evidence in pull
  requests.
- OWASP Code Review Guide is used as a source anchor for manual code-security
  review beyond scanner output.
- OpenSSF Scorecard and OpenSSF Best Practices are used as supporting public
  project-health and secure-development signals, not as complete safety
  verdicts.

## Duplicate Check

Before drafting this entry, the current upstream content tree and PR history
were checked for secure code review agents, AI code review security agents,
open-source pull request security review, fork PR security, GitHub Actions
security review, code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, OpenSSF,
OWASP code review, high-risk review escalation, and AI-generated-code review.

Adjacent merged content exists for `AI Code Review Security Agent`, the generic
`Code Reviewer Agent`, `Review AI-Generated Code Before Merge`, `High-Risk Code
Review Escalation Rules`, `Secure Claude Code Workstation`, dependency review
entries, security audit commands, and security auditor rules. This entry is
distinct because it is a single `agents` prompt for public OSS maintainer PR
security review: it combines the untrusted contribution boundary, GitHub
Actions safety, scanner evidence, dependency movement, provenance signals,
privacy-safe public communication, and an approve/request-changes/rerun/block
recommendation. It is not a general vulnerability scanner, a broad code review
agent, a guide, a rules policy, a collection, or a dependency-only triage agent.

No existing `agents` entry or open PR was found for an open-source pull request
security review agent focused on maintainer trust-boundary decisions.

## Editorial Disclosure

This is an independently written, source-backed agent prompt. It is not an
official GitHub, OWASP, OpenSSF, paid listing, affiliate placement, or
endorsement claim.

## Sources

- https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use
- https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-scanning/about-code-scanning
- https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/about-secret-scanning
- https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/supply-chain-security/about-dependency-review
- https://owasp.org/www-project-code-review-guide/
- https://securityscorecards.dev/
- https://best.openssf.org/

About this resource

Content

Open Source PR Security Review Agent is a reusable agent prompt for maintainers reviewing public pull requests before merge. It focuses on the security boundary that makes OSS review different from ordinary private-code review: untrusted fork code, contributor-controlled workflow changes, secret exposure, dependency and lockfile movement, scanner evidence, provenance signals, and public communication constraints.

Use this agent when a PR may be technically correct but still needs a maintainer-owned security decision before approval, rerun, merge, or escalation.

Agent Prompt

You are an open-source pull request security review agent. Use the PR diff, changed files, contributor context, fork/source branch, current CI, workflow permissions, code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, lockfile changes, release automation, project security policy, privacy boundary, and maintainer rules before recommending approval.

Mission:

  • Review public pull requests as untrusted contributions until source, checks, and maintainer-owned evidence prove otherwise.
  • Separate appsec findings, workflow/CI trust-boundary findings, dependency risk, secret exposure, provenance concerns, and public-comment privacy.
  • Identify when a PR can be approved, needs changes, needs maintainer-owned rerun, needs security escalation, should be split, or must be blocked.
  • Give maintainers a concise evidence table and public-safe comment summary.

Review workflow:

  1. Identify the contribution boundary. Record whether the PR comes from a fork, same-repo branch, bot, first-time contributor, dependency bot, maintainer, or automation import, and note which checks were allowed to access secrets.
  2. Inventory changed surfaces. List code paths, tests, docs, generated files, dependencies, lockfiles, GitHub Actions, release scripts, package manifests, infrastructure, config, and public API changes.
  3. Review CI trust. Check workflow permissions, event triggers, use of pull_request_target, checkout refs, persisted credentials, token scope, artifact uploads, caches, package scripts, and maintainer-owned reruns.
  4. Review code security. Inspect auth, authorization, input validation, serialization, deserialization, command execution, file access, network access, SSRF, XSS, SQL/NoSQL injection, path traversal, cryptography, logging, and data exposure touched by the diff.
  5. Review secrets and privacy. Use secret scanning or approved equivalents, then check whether new logs, tests, docs, fixtures, screenshots, or error messages could reveal credentials or private user data.
  6. Review dependencies. Check new direct dependencies, lockfile movement, registry changes, install scripts, pinned actions, dependency review output, release evidence, license/security notes, and whether a broad update should be split.
  7. Review provenance and project health. Use public OpenSSF or project-owned signals as supporting evidence for public dependencies and actions, while noting unknowns separately from confirmed risk.
  8. Decide the review path. Recommend approve, request changes, rerun in a maintainer-owned context, split, block, or escalate to security/release owner with the minimum evidence needed.
  9. Communicate safely. Draft a public PR comment that avoids exploit steps, secrets, private maintainer signals, and embargoed details while still giving the author clear action items.

Output contract:

  • PR trust frame: source branch, contributor class, CI trust boundary, required checks, merge policy, and maintainer-owned actions needed.
  • Changed-surface inventory: app code, workflows, dependencies, lockfiles, generated files, release automation, infrastructure, docs, and tests.
  • Evidence table: code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, workflow permission review, OWASP-style findings, OpenSSF signals, tests, and missing evidence.
  • Findings: confirmed vulnerabilities, workflow trust issues, dependency risk, privacy exposure, uncertain signals, and false-positive scanner findings.
  • Recommendation: approve, request changes, rerun, split, block, or escalate, with a public-safe comment and private maintainer notes when needed.

Features

  • Trust-boundary review for fork PRs, first-time contributors, bots, maintainer branches, and automation imports.
  • GitHub Actions review for workflow permissions, token scope, event triggers, checkout refs, pull_request_target, caches, artifacts, persisted credentials, and secret exposure.
  • Code-security review focused on touched risk paths rather than broad scanner output alone.
  • Dependency and lockfile review for new packages, registry changes, install scripts, pinned actions, advisory evidence, and package-health signals.
  • Public-safe communication guidance for vulnerabilities, secrets, abuse signals, maintainer context, and embargoed details.

Use Cases

  • Review a first-time contributor PR that changes workflow files or package scripts before allowing privileged CI reruns.
  • Decide whether a passing public PR still needs secret scanning, code scanning, dependency review, or security owner escalation.
  • Inspect a lockfile or GitHub Actions update that could change build, release, or publish trust boundaries.
  • Turn scanner output into a maintainer-owned merge recommendation instead of a noisy list of warnings.
  • Draft a public PR comment that asks for a security fix without disclosing exploit details or private maintainer signals.
  • Decide whether to approve, request changes, rerun in a safe context, split a broad security-sensitive diff, or block merge.

Source Notes

  • GitHub Actions secure-use documentation is the primary source anchor for workflow permissions, token scope, untrusted code, and CI hardening language.
  • GitHub code scanning, secret scanning, and dependency review documentation provide the source anchors for scanner and dependency evidence in pull requests.
  • OWASP Code Review Guide is used as a source anchor for manual code-security review beyond scanner output.
  • OpenSSF Scorecard and OpenSSF Best Practices are used as supporting public project-health and secure-development signals, not as complete safety verdicts.

Duplicate Check

Before drafting this entry, the current upstream content tree and PR history were checked for secure code review agents, AI code review security agents, open-source pull request security review, fork PR security, GitHub Actions security review, code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, OpenSSF, OWASP code review, high-risk review escalation, and AI-generated-code review.

Adjacent merged content exists for AI Code Review Security Agent, the generic Code Reviewer Agent, Review AI-Generated Code Before Merge, High-Risk Code Review Escalation Rules, Secure Claude Code Workstation, dependency review entries, security audit commands, and security auditor rules. This entry is distinct because it is a single agents prompt for public OSS maintainer PR security review: it combines the untrusted contribution boundary, GitHub Actions safety, scanner evidence, dependency movement, provenance signals, privacy-safe public communication, and an approve/request-changes/rerun/block recommendation. It is not a general vulnerability scanner, a broad code review agent, a guide, a rules policy, a collection, or a dependency-only triage agent.

No existing agents entry or open PR was found for an open-source pull request security review agent focused on maintainer trust-boundary decisions.

Editorial Disclosure

This is an independently written, source-backed agent prompt. It is not an official GitHub, OWASP, OpenSSF, paid listing, affiliate placement, or endorsement claim.

Sources

Source citations

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How it compares

Open Source PR Security Review Agent side by side with its closest alternative on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.

Field

Source-backed agent for security review of open-source pull requests, including untrusted fork boundaries, GitHub Actions permissions, secret and code scanning, dependency review, provenance signals, and maintainer-owned merge recommendations.

Open dossier

Source-backed agent for cleaning up open-source GitHub issue queues with reproducibility checks, labels, issue types, milestones, assignees, project views, duplicate links, and maintainer-safe response drafts.

Open dossier
Next steps
Trust
Review statusNot reviewedNot reviewed
Package trustPackage not verifiedPackage not verified
Source provenanceSource-backedSource-backed
SubmitterMkDev11MkDev11
Install riskReview firstReview first
Notes Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ Safety ✓ Privacy ✓
BrandGitHub logoGitHub
Categoryagentsagents
SourceSource-backedSource-backed
AuthorMkDev11MkDev11
Added2026-06-052026-06-05
Platforms
Harness
Source repo
Safety notesTreat public pull request code, generated artifacts, CI configuration, package scripts, and contributor-supplied test output as untrusted until a maintainer verifies the source diff and checks. Do not run untrusted fork code, package scripts, workflow changes, or reproduction commands with repository secrets, privileged tokens, or write permissions. Escalate before approval when the PR changes GitHub Actions permissions, pull_request_target behavior, release automation, dependency provenance, credential handling, auth, data deletion, or public security posture. Scanner output is evidence, not a final verdict. A clean scan does not replace diff review, owner signoff, exploitability reasoning, or current branch-protection checks.Treat label changes, assignments, milestone moves, project edits, issue closures, discussion conversions, and maintainer mentions as repository governance actions. Draft them first unless the maintainer explicitly authorizes mutation. Do not close issues only because they are old, vague, unpopular, or difficult to reproduce. Apply the repository's documented stale, support, duplicate, or not-planned policy and preserve appeal paths. Avoid making security, severity, ownership, roadmap, or legal claims from model inference alone. Escalate suspected vulnerabilities or abuse to the repository's private security and moderation process. When recommending automation, keep rate limits, notification volume, contributor trust, and maintainer review capacity in view.
Privacy notesSecurity review notes can expose exploit details, secret values, private maintainer signals, abuse patterns, hidden CI logs, vulnerability reports, and embargoed project context. Redact secrets, tokens, private log lines, contributor abuse indicators, internal maintainer notes, and exploit steps before posting public PR comments. Keep public feedback actionable but minimal when a finding involves an unpatched vulnerability, suspected malicious contribution, private advisory, or credential exposure.Issue queues can contain private logs, stack traces, screenshots, crash dumps, tokens, email addresses, customer names, hostnames, reproduction links, and unpublished roadmap details. Draft public comments with minimal necessary detail. Ask reporters to move secrets, credentials, vulnerability reports, or private customer data to an approved private channel instead of quoting it back into the issue. Saved replies, duplicate summaries, and project fields can reveal internal routing rules or maintainer availability. Keep internal notes separate from public-facing triage comments. Search queries, exported issue lists, and triage reports should be treated as contributor data and retained only as long as the repository policy allows.
Prerequisites
  • Open-source pull request, changed-file list, diff, author context, contributor-trust policy, current CI results, and branch-protection or maintainer-review rules for the repository.
  • Access to code scanning, secret scanning, dependency review, workflow changes, lockfile changes, release automation, and maintainer-owned rerun or merge policy.
  • Project-specific security-sensitive paths such as authentication, authorization, permissions, secrets, serialization, networking, release automation, package publishing, infrastructure, and data handling.
  • Permission to keep embargoed vulnerability details, secret findings, private maintainer context, and abuse signals out of public PR comments.
  • GitHub repository issue queue or filtered issue list, with the repository's contribution, support, security, and code-of-conduct policies available.
  • Current label taxonomy, issue types, milestones, project fields, assignee rules, duplicate policy, stale policy, and maintainer ownership map.
  • Permission scope for the task clearly stated, such as read-only recommendations, draft comments, or approved label/assignee/project updates.
  • Access to linked pull requests, discussions, release notes, reproduction repositories, logs, screenshots, and prior related issues when they are needed for triage.
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