PostToolUse hook that inspects an edited npm package-lock.json for supply-chain provenance risk rather than known CVEs — dependencies resolved from outside the public npm registry (git, alternate-registry, or insecure transports) and registry tarballs missing an integrity hash.
Open the source and read safety notes before installing.
Source-backed facts for citing this resource, derived directly from the registry — also available as plain text for AI assistants.
Decision playbook
Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.
0
78
—
No baseline selected
No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.
Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.
Source link availableRequired
Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.
Source provenance statusRequired
Marked as source-backed.
Metadata reviewed
Registry metadata indicates a reviewed listing.
Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.
Safety notes presentRequired
Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.
Privacy notes presentRequired
Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.
Trust level risk gateRequired
Trust level does not block evaluation.
Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.
Install payload available
Install or copy payload is available for review.
Package verification flag
No package verification flag provided.
Checksum metadata
No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.
Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.
Compare tray has multiple entries
Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.
Baseline comparison available
No baseline peer selected yet.
Diverging trust signals identified
No major trust-signal divergence found.
Setup at a glance
Copy-ready — paste the snippet to get started.
Adoption plan
Current risk score 16/100. Use staged verification before broader rollout.
Validate source and review signals before any execution.
Confirm source provenanceRequired
Source URL/provenance metadata is present.
Confirm metadata review state
Listing has review metadata.
Verify install payload
Install/config payload exists and can be inspected.
Confirm safety, privacy, and package integrity signals.
Review safety notesRequired
Safety notes are present.
Review privacy notesRequired
Privacy notes are present.
Verify package integrity metadata
No package verification/checksum metadata.
Adopt in controlled steps based on the selected plan.
Run in isolated sandbox firstRequired
Use a constrained sandbox and observe behavior across multiple tasks.
Roll out graduallyRequired
Roll out to a small cohort before wider usage.
Set monitoring and fallback
Define rollback path and monitor errors after adoption.
Evidence readiness
Required evidence gates are covered (5/6 signals complete).
Source repository/provenance is listed.
Required in this preset
Review metadata is present.
Required in this preset
Safety notes are present.
Required in this preset
Privacy notes are present.
Optional in this preset
Package integrity metadata is missing.
Optional in this preset
Install payload is available.
Required in this preset
Required evidence gates are covered for this preset.
Decision timeline
5/6 steps complete with no blocking gaps for this preset.
triage
Source/provenance metadata is available.
triage
Review metadata is available.
verify
Safety notes are available.
verify
Privacy notes are available.
verify
Package integrity metadata is missing.
rollout
Install payload is available.
No required blockers for this timeline preset.
Prerequisite readiness
2 prerequisites to line up before setup.
Safety & privacy surface
3 safety and 3 privacy notes across 3 risk areas. Review closely: network access.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -u
# Claude Code PostToolUse hook. Inspects an edited npm package-lock.json for
# supply-chain provenance risk (the lockfile-lint check set): dependencies
# resolved from outside the public npm registry and registry tarballs missing
# an integrity hash. Advisory only - it always exits 0, never installs or runs
# anything - and fails open when jq is unavailable.
command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
INPUT=$(cat)
FILE=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // .tool_input.path // ""')
case "$FILE" in
*package-lock.json|*npm-shrinkwrap.json) : ;;
*yarn.lock|*pnpm-lock.yaml)
printf -v SAFE_FILE '%q' "$FILE"
echo "Lockfile changed - run 'npx lockfile-lint --path $SAFE_FILE --validate-https --validate-integrity' to check resolved hosts and integrity." >&2
exit 0 ;;
*) exit 0 ;;
esac
[ -f "$FILE" ] || exit 0
# npm v2/v3 lockfiles use the .packages map; older formats are skipped.
jq -e 'has("packages")' "$FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
found=0
sanitize_output() {
LC_ALL=C tr -d '\000-\010\013-\037\177'
}
report() {
local lines
lines=$(jq -r "$2" "$FILE" 2>/dev/null | sanitize_output | sed '/^$/d' | head -10)
if [ -n "$lines" ]; then
echo "$1" >&2
printf '%s\n' "$lines" | while IFS= read -r l; do
[ -n "$l" ] && printf ' - %s\n' "$l" >&2
done
found=1
fi
}
# Anything whose resolved URL is not an https public-registry tarball is a
# provenance signal: git sources, alternate registries, and insecure
# transports all fail this test.
report "Dependencies resolved from outside the public npm registry (supply-chain risk):" \
'def clean: gsub("[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]"; ""); .packages | to_entries[] | select(.value.resolved) | select(.value.resolved | test("^https://registry\\.npmjs\\.org/") | not) | "\(.key | clean): \(.value.resolved | clean)"'
report "Registry tarballs missing an integrity hash:" \
'def clean: gsub("[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]"; ""); .packages | to_entries[] | select(.value.resolved) | select(.value.resolved | test("^https://registry\\.npmjs\\.org/")) | select((.value.integrity // "") == "") | (.key | clean)'
if [ "$found" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "Confirm these sources are expected; run lockfile-lint for the full check set and an allowlist." >&2
fi
exit 0{
"hooks": {
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/lockfile-provenance-checker.sh"
}
]
}
]
}
}package-lock.json for supply-chain provenance risk — where a dependency came from — rather than known CVEs.0 and never installs, runs, or fetches anything.yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml it prints a one-line reminder to run lockfile-lint, since those formats are not JSON.On PostToolUse, the hook checks whether the edited file is an npm lockfile. For package-lock.json (npm v2/v3, the .packages map), it scans each resolved dependency and reports any entry whose resolved URL is not an https public-registry tarball, or that lacks an integrity hash. Findings go to stderr with a reminder to confirm the sources and run lockfile-lint for the full check set.
CVE scanners answer "does this version have a known vulnerability?". This hook answers a different question: "did this dependency come from where I expect?" A swapped registry, a git URL pointing at a fork, an insecure transport, or a missing integrity hash are tampering and dependency-confusion signals that a CVE scan will not catch.
mkdir -p .claude/hookstouch .claude/hooks/lockfile-provenance-checker.shchmod +x .claude/hooks/lockfile-provenance-checker.sh.claude/settings.json (project) or ~/.claude/settings.json (user).{
"hooks": {
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/lockfile-provenance-checker.sh"
}
]
}
]
}
}
package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json; for yarn.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml it defers to lockfile-lint.Show that Lockfile Provenance Checker - Claude Code Hook is listed on HeyClaude. Paste this Markdown into your README — it renders the badge and links back to this page.
[](https://heyclau.de/entry/hooks/lockfile-provenance-checker)Lockfile Provenance Checker - Claude Code Hook side by side with 3 alternatives on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.
2 trust signals differ across this comparison (Source provenance, Submitter).
| Field | PostToolUse hook that inspects an edited npm package-lock.json for supply-chain provenance risk rather than known CVEs — dependencies resolved from outside the public npm registry (git, alternate-registry, or insecure transports) and registry tarballs missing an integrity hash. Open dossier | PostToolUse hook that flags risky package-lock.json, yarn.lock, and pnpm-lock.yaml edits: missing lockfile updates, unexpected registry hosts, and dependency count spikes before merge. Open dossier | Automatically checks for outdated dependencies and suggests updates with security analysis. This PostToolUse hook triggers when dependency manifest files (package.json, requirements.txt, Gemfile, go.mod, Cargo.toml, pyproject.toml) are modified, providing real-time dependency health monitoring. Open dossier | PostToolUse hook that watches dependency manifest and lockfile edits, then prompts or runs an OSS Review Toolkit dependency license analysis. Open dossier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Next steps | ||||
| Trust | ||||
| Review status | ReviewedMaintainer reviewed | ReviewedMaintainer reviewed | ReviewedMaintainer reviewed | ReviewedMaintainer reviewed |
| Package trust | Package not verified | Package not verified | Package not verified | Package not verified |
| Source provenanceDiffers | Source-backed | Submission linkedSource submission | Source-backed | Source-backed |
| SubmitterDiffers | techforgeworks | kiannidev | — | oktofeesh1 |
| Install risk | Review first | Review first | Review first | Review first |
| Notes | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ | Safety ✓ Privacy ✓ |
| Brand | — | — | — | — |
| Category | hooks | hooks | hooks | hooks |
| Source | Source-backed | Source-backed | Source-backed | Source-backed |
| Author | techforgeworks | kiannidev | JSONbored | OSS Review Toolkit |
| Added | 2026-06-04 | 2026-06-17 | 2025-09-16 | 2026-06-04 |
| Platforms | ||||
| Harness | ||||
| Source repo | — | — | — | — |
| Safety notes | ✓Runs after every Write, Edit, and MultiEdit and inspects only npm package-lock.json or npm-shrinkwrap.json content; for yarn.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml it prints a one-line reminder to run lockfile-lint. Read-only and advisory - it parses the lockfile JSON, never installs packages, runs npm, or makes a network call, and always exits 0. Uses the resolved-URL and integrity fields to flag provenance risk (sources outside the public registry, missing integrity); it does not assess known vulnerabilities, so pair it with an audit tool. | ✓Read-only advisory hook; it does not block writes unless you wrap it with strict exit handling. Does not substitute for npm audit, OSV scans, or CI dependency review. | ✓Runs automatically on its configured Claude Code hook event and executes shell logic that can read, modify, or delete files in your project (and may run builds, installs, or network calls); review the script and scope it to expected paths before enabling. | ✓Runs after Write, Edit, and MultiEdit and inspects only the edited file path to decide whether a dependency manifest or lockfile changed. Install this project-relative command only in the trusted project's `.claude/settings.json`; user/global hooks must point to a trusted absolute path outside project directories. Default mode is advisory, prints the ORT command to run, and always exits 0 without reading dependency contents, creating reports, or contacting registries. When `ORT_LICENSE_HOOK_RUN=1` is set, it runs `ort analyze` in the project root and writes reports under `.claude/ort-license-checks/` by default. An opted-in ORT run may invoke package managers, inspect dependency graphs, read project configuration, fetch package metadata, and take several minutes on large repositories. Strict mode exits 2 only when `ORT_LICENSE_HOOK_STRICT=1` is also set and the opted-in ORT analysis fails. |
| Privacy notes | ✓Reads only the local lockfile from disk; it makes no network or registry calls. Prints dependency paths and their resolved URLs to local hook stderr; it writes no logs. Resolved URLs shown in output may include internal registry or git host names if your project depends on them. | ✓Lockfile paths and registry hostnames are printed locally to stderr for the active session. | ✓Receives Claude Code hook input (session metadata, file paths, and tool output) and reads local project files; review what the script logs or forwards to external services and keep credentials out of its output. | ✓Default advisory mode prints only the changed dependency file path and the suggested local ORT command. Opted-in ORT runs can record dependency names, versions, package metadata, source URLs, license findings, project paths, package-manager output, and configuration details in local report files. Package managers or ORT integrations may contact configured package registries, VCS hosts, or metadata services during analysis. Review generated reports before sharing them because internal package names, private registry hostnames, source URLs, and license-policy exceptions can be sensitive. |
| Prerequisites |
|
| — none listed |
|
| Install | | | | |
| Config | | | | |
| Citations | ||||
| Claim | Unclaimed | Unclaimed | Unclaimed | Unclaimed |
Source-backed guides for putting this to work.
Verify MCP package provenance and publisher trust before adding servers to Claude Code.
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