Source-backed rules for AI workflow directories that need consistent privacy metadata before accepting entries that touch prompts, files, local tools, hosted services, telemetry, generated artifacts, or personal data.
Privacy metadata is a reviewer aid, not proof that a workflow is safe or compliant for every jurisdiction or organization., Escalate entries that touch regulated data, customer records, credentials, browser state, production systems, or private repositories., Do not let generated descriptions replace source-backed privacy notes; require the submitter to identify actual data paths.
Privacy notes
The review itself can expose private repo names, tool config, prompt examples, customer-like fixtures, logs, screenshots, or vendor account details., Avoid copying secrets, private prompts, personal data, or proprietary datasets into public metadata examples., Record unknowns honestly instead of filling gaps with guessed retention, sharing, or telemetry behavior.
Author
MkDev11
Submitted by
MkDev11
Claim status
unclaimed
Last verified
2026-06-04
Decision playbook
Review trust signals before you adopt
Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.
Compare context
Selected
0
Current score
78
Baseline
—
Delta
No baseline selected
No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.
Source and provenance checks
Complete
Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.
Source link availableRequired
Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.
Done
Source provenance statusRequired
Marked as source-backed.
Done
Metadata reviewed
Registry metadata indicates a reviewed listing.
Done
Safety and privacy checks
Complete
Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.
Safety notes presentRequired
Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.
Done
Privacy notes presentRequired
Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.
Done
Trust level risk gateRequired
Trust level does not block evaluation.
Done
Package and install checks
Needs review
Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.
Install payload available
Install or copy payload is available for review.
Done
Package verification flag
No package verification flag provided.
Pending
Checksum metadata
No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.
Pending
Compare-driven decision checks
Needs review
Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.
Compare tray has multiple entries
Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.
You are reviewing privacy metadata for an AI workflow directory entry.
Rules:
1. Identify the data touched before judging usefulness.
2. Record whether the workflow runs locally, in a hosted service, through an
MCP server, through a browser, or through a third-party API.
3. Name what may be retained, logged, exported, shared, or generated.
4. Require privacy notes when prompts, files, secrets, personal data, logs,
telemetry, or customer-like examples can be exposed.
5. Do not merge entries with vague "no privacy risk" claims when the workflow
reads private context or sends data to another service.
6. Keep provenance and review dates visible so users know how fresh the
privacy metadata is.
About this resource
Purpose
Use these rules when reviewing privacy metadata for an AI workflow directory
entry. The goal is to make privacy-relevant facts visible before users install,
copy, run, recommend, or submit a workflow.
This is not a legal compliance checklist. It is an editorial rule set for
directory maintainers and contributors: name the data touched, name where it
goes, name what is retained or unknown, and keep the evidence fresh.
Required Metadata
Every entry that can touch private context should answer these questions.
What data is touched? Prompts, source files, generated files, logs,
tickets, browser state, clipboard content, secrets, embeddings, telemetry,
datasets, screenshots, transcripts, model outputs, or customer-like examples.
Where does it run? Local shell, local app, browser extension, MCP server,
hosted API, cloud worker, SaaS integration, CI job, notebook, or background
automation.
Where can data go? Model provider, tool vendor, third-party API, local
disk, logs, vector store, issue tracker, pull request, metrics backend,
public artifact, or generated documentation.
What is retained? Nothing known, local files only, request logs,
transcripts, analytics, cache entries, uploaded files, embeddings, traces, or
unknown retention.
Who controls access? The local user, project workspace, organization
account, vendor account, shared team space, public repository, or downstream
service.
What evidence supports this? Documentation, source code, package metadata,
configuration examples, policy pages, changelog notes, or maintainer review.
If a field is unknown, write "unknown" with the reason. Do not silently omit it.
Review Rules
Require privacy notes when the workflow reads or writes private context.
Distinguish local execution from hosted processing.
Distinguish user-controlled storage from vendor-controlled retention.
Describe generated artifacts that can leak private data, such as summaries,
screenshots, traces, notebooks, reports, indexes, embeddings, or README output.
Record provenance for privacy claims: source URL, reviewed file, policy page,
or maintainer note.
Include a last-reviewed date or freshness note when privacy behavior depends
on external documentation.
Keep examples synthetic. Do not use real secrets, account IDs, customer names,
private repository names, or production incidents as sample metadata.
Privacy Note Patterns
Use direct, observable wording. Good privacy notes say what may be exposed and
where.
"This workflow reads local source files and sends selected snippets to a
hosted model provider."
"The command writes generated reports to the repository; review them before
committing because they may include private file paths or excerpts."
"The MCP server can access issue titles and comments through the configured
account permissions."
"Retention behavior is not documented in the source material; treat uploaded
prompts and files as vendor-processed until confirmed."
"Telemetry can include command names, timestamps, project identifiers, or
anonymized usage counts; do not include secrets in labels or run names."
Avoid vague notes such as "privacy safe," "no risk," "secure by default," or
"does not store data" unless the source evidence says exactly what is not stored.
Grounded Reference Table
The review rules above map directly onto established application-security
guidance. The OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet is the primary anchor: it enumerates the
data categories that must not be captured in logs or artifacts, requires bounded
retention, and demands due-diligence checks before data leaves for a third
party. Use the table below to trace each metadata field back to a published
practice.
Metadata field in this rule set
Grounded practice
Source
Data touched (secrets, tokens, PII)
Source code, session IDs, access tokens, passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, payment/bank data, and sensitive PII (e.g. health, government identifiers) "should usually not be recorded directly" and must be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted
OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet, "What not to log"
Data movement / sharing
"Perform due diligence checks (regulatory and security) before sending event data to third parties"
OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet, deployment & operation
Retention known
"Log data, temporary debug logs, and backups/copies/extractions, must not be destroyed before the duration of the required data retention period, and must not be kept beyond this time"; legal, regulatory, and contractual obligations affect the period
OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet, retention
Execution surface / transparency
Disclose data practices honestly and tell users when data is collected, processed, or handed to external parties
OWASP User Privacy Protection Cheat Sheet, "Honesty & Transparency"
Consistent labels / structured fields
Use a defined logging vocabulary so event and field names stay predictable and do not leak sensitive values in labels
OWASP Logging Vocabulary Cheat Sheet
Data categories & provenance vocabulary
Standardized terms for personal-data categories, processing purposes, and provenance
W3C Data Privacy Vocabulary (DPV)
This table does not restate the reviewer prompt in copySnippet; it documents
the external evidence behind the field definitions so a maintainer can verify
each rule against current guidance.
Directory Entry Checklist
{"task": "Data touched", "description": "The entry names prompts, files, logs, browser state, secrets, telemetry, generated artifacts, or personal data it may touch"}
{"task": "Execution surface", "description": "The entry says whether processing is local, hosted, browser-based, MCP-based, CI-based, or third-party API-based"}
{"task": "Data movement", "description": "The entry names where data can be sent, stored, logged, cached, exported, or published"}
{"task": "Retention known", "description": "Retention, logging, cache, transcript, trace, artifact, or unknown behavior is stated plainly"}
{"task": "Source evidence", "description": "Privacy claims are backed by current docs, source code, package metadata, policy pages, or maintainer review"}
{"task": "Freshness noted", "description": "The reviewer can tell when the privacy metadata was last checked or why it is still current"}
Do Not Merge When
the entry says "no privacy impact" but reads prompts, files, logs, browser
state, secrets, customer-like examples, or generated artifacts;
hosted processing is described as local-only;
telemetry, retention, uploads, caches, traces, or generated reports are
omitted even though the workflow can create them;
private examples are copied into public metadata;
vendor claims about privacy are repeated without a source URL or reviewed
source file;
unknown retention or sharing behavior is hidden instead of disclosed.
Troubleshooting
The docs do not mention retention: say retention is unknown and require a
maintainer review before presenting the workflow as privacy-preserving.
A tool runs locally but calls a hosted model: describe both surfaces.
The entry has privacy notes but no source evidence: ask for the policy,
repo file, package docs, or configuration page that supports the notes.
Generated artifacts may include private data: require a review step before
committing or publishing those artifacts.
The submitter wants to keep metadata short: keep the card short, but put
the privacy facts in the entry body where users can inspect them.
Duplicate Check
Checked existing rules, guides, collections, hooks, skills, MCP entries,
statuslines, registry quality code, submission policy code, and recent PRs for
privacy metadata rules, privacy notes, data touched review, retention metadata,
privacy policy routing, data provenance, and AI workflow directory privacy.
Adjacent content includes a privacy-first research collection and registry
quality helpers that score privacy metadata. This rules entry is distinct
because it gives portable do/don't behavior for contributors and reviewers who
must decide whether any AI workflow directory entry has enough privacy metadata
to merge.
DPV Concept Mapping
The W3C Data Privacy Vocabulary (dpv, namespace https://w3id.org/dpv#) provides standardized top-level concepts that map onto the privacy facts these rules ask reviewers to capture. Use the DPV term as a shared vocabulary when a submitter's privacy notes need a precise label.
DPV concept
DPV definition (verbatim)
PersonalData
Data and Personal Data categories
Processing
operations over data
Purpose
that justify the (end) goal for which data is processed or technologies are used
Entity
for actors and the roles they can take
DataSubject
The individual (or category of individuals) whose personal data is being processed.
DataController
The individual or organisation that decides (or controls) the purpose(s) of processing personal data.
LegalBasis
such as consent or contract that justify the process
Risk
for assessment and management of risks and impacts
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How it compares
Privacy Metadata Rules side by side with 3 alternatives on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.
1 trust signal differ across this comparison (Submitter).
Source-backed rules for AI workflow directories that need consistent privacy metadata before accepting entries that touch prompts, files, local tools, hosted services, telemetry, generated artifacts, or personal data.
Source-backed rules for reviewing AI-generated request handlers and forms before merge for cross-site request forgery risk, covering state-changing method discipline, anti-CSRF token correctness, SameSite cookie posture, origin and referer checks, and safe handling of cookie-based sessions.
Source-backed rules for reviewing AI-generated endpoints and data-access code before merge for insecure direct object reference risk, covering per-request object-level authorization checks, scoped database lookups, identifier exposure, and consistent enforcement across read, write, and admin operations.
Source-backed rules for reviewing AI-generated code that builds or runs operating-system commands, shell invocations, or subprocesses before merge for command injection and argument injection risk, covering library alternatives to shelling out, array-form process APIs, allowlist input validation, and least-privilege execution.
✓Privacy metadata is a reviewer aid, not proof that a workflow is safe or compliant for every jurisdiction or organization.
Escalate entries that touch regulated data, customer records, credentials, browser state, production systems, or private repositories.
Do not let generated descriptions replace source-backed privacy notes; require the submitter to identify actual data paths.
✓A missing CSRF defense lets a malicious page perform state-changing actions as a logged-in user — transferring funds, changing email or password, or deleting data — using the victim's ambient cookies.
AI assistants often generate handlers that work in tests yet omit token validation or perform state changes on GET, because the happy path succeeds without any forged cross-site request.
Relying on SameSite cookies alone is not sufficient: defaults vary, Lax still allows top-level GET navigations, and some clients or legacy browsers do not enforce it.
✓A missing object-level authorization check lets any authenticated (or sometimes unauthenticated) user read, modify, or delete another user's data by changing an identifier in the request — accounts, documents, orders, invoices, and support tickets are common targets.
AI assistants often generate a correct-looking handler for the current user's own data and skip the cross-user check entirely, because the happy-path test only ever exercises the requester's own objects.
Switching to random/UUID identifiers reduces guessability but is not an authorization control; do not accept it as a substitute for a server-side ownership or permission check.
✓A successful OS command injection lets an attacker run arbitrary commands with the privileges of the running process, which can mean full remote code execution, data exfiltration, or lateral movement on the host.
AI assistants often shell out with a string-interpolated command (f-string, template literal, string concatenation) because it is the shortest path to invoking an external tool, without switching to the array-form API or validating input.
Even a fixed, non-attacker-controlled command name is not safe if an attacker can control one of its arguments — argument injection can still cause information disclosure or code execution depending on the command.
Privacy notes
✓The review itself can expose private repo names, tool config, prompt examples, customer-like fixtures, logs, screenshots, or vendor account details.
Avoid copying secrets, private prompts, personal data, or proprietary datasets into public metadata examples.
Record unknowns honestly instead of filling gaps with guessed retention, sharing, or telemetry behavior.
✓CSRF tokens are security credentials; do not paste real tokens, session cookies, or production request captures into public PR comments or issues.
Use synthetic accounts and redacted requests when demonstrating a CSRF proof of concept, and avoid attaching real user identifiers.
Be careful that anti-CSRF tokens are not written into URLs, analytics, or logs, where they can leak through referer headers or shared dashboards.
✓IDOR proof-of-concept testing can expose another account's real data; use synthetic test accounts and synthetic objects rather than real user records when demonstrating the issue.
Do not paste real user identifiers, documents, or other objects retrieved during testing into a public PR or issue; redact or replace them with placeholders.
Server-side logs and error messages for a denied access attempt should avoid echoing back the unauthorized object's contents, only that access was denied.
✓Command injection proof-of-concept payloads and captured process output can expose real filesystem contents, environment variables, or credentials; use a sandboxed environment and redact captures before pasting them into a PR or issue.
Do not commit real file paths, hostnames, or internal tool names discovered while testing a suspected injection into a public PR or issue description.
Subprocess output and error streams are a common place for secrets (API keys, tokens in env vars) to leak into logs; avoid logging raw stdout/stderr from a shelled-out command that could echo them back.
Prerequisites
A directory entry or submission that describes an AI workflow, tool, MCP server, hook, skill, command, collection, guide, or hosted service.
Permission to request edits when privacy notes, source links, data categories, or execution surfaces are missing.
Access to source documentation for the tool or workflow, including where it runs and what data it reads or transmits.
A review place for recording privacy-relevant assumptions, unknowns, and last-checked dates.
A pull request, diff, or snippet containing an AI-generated or AI-edited request handler, form, or fetch call with enough context to know how the user is authenticated.
Knowledge of how the framework manages sessions and CSRF tokens, since built-in protection, cookie defaults, and token helpers differ between frameworks.
Awareness of which routes change state and which are read-only, so the review can focus on unsafe methods.
Permission to block merge when a cookie-authenticated state change ships without a CSRF defense.
A pull request, diff, or snippet containing an AI-generated or AI-edited endpoint, resolver, or data-access function that accepts an object identifier from the request.
Knowledge of the application's ownership/permission model, since what counts as "authorized" differs between single-owner resources, shared resources, and admin-only resources.
Access to at least two distinct user accounts (or awareness of how to create them) to verify cross-account access is actually denied, not just assumed.
Permission to block merge when an object-level authorization check is missing, inconsistent, or client-trusted.
A pull request, diff, or snippet containing AI-generated or AI-edited code that builds a shell command string or invokes a subprocess/child process.
Knowledge of which values in the command or its arguments originate from user input, uploaded files, configuration, or other external systems.
Familiarity with the target language's array-form process APIs (subprocess, child_process, ProcessBuilder, or equivalent) so a shell-string call can be reviewed against a safer alternative.
Permission to block merge when untrusted input reaches a shell-parsed command without validation, or when a safer library alternative exists and was not used.