Slash command for auditing a remote MCP server authorization setup, including protected resource metadata, authorization server discovery, OAuth resource indicators, token audience validation, scopes, and token passthrough risk.
The command may ask the assistant to inspect authentication metadata and token-flow evidence; do not paste production bearer tokens into the prompt., Treat missing resource metadata, wrong-audience token acceptance, or token passthrough as blocking findings.
Privacy notes
Metadata and audit output can expose identity providers, scopes, tenant identifiers, redirect URLs, and private server URLs., Redact token claims and account identifiers before sharing command output publicly.
Author
JSONbored
Submitted by
JSONbored
Claim status
unclaimed
Last verified
2026-06-05
Decision playbook
Review trust signals before you adopt
Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.
Compare context
Selected
0
Current score
63
Baseline
—
Delta
No baseline selected
No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.
Source and provenance checks
Needs review
Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.
Source link availableRequired
Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.
Done
Source provenance statusRequired
Marked as source-backed.
Done
Metadata reviewed
No reviewed flag detected in metadata.
Pending
Safety and privacy checks
Complete
Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.
Safety notes presentRequired
Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.
Done
Privacy notes presentRequired
Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.
Done
Trust level risk gateRequired
Trust level does not block evaluation.
Done
Package and install checks
Needs review
Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.
Install payload available
Install or copy payload is available for review.
Done
Package verification flag
No package verification flag provided.
Pending
Checksum metadata
No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.
Pending
Compare-driven decision checks
Needs review
Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.
Compare tray has multiple entries
Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.
3 prerequisites to line up before setup. Have accounts and credentials ready first.
0/3 ready
Account & credentials2General1
Safety & privacy surface
Safety & privacy surface
2 safety and 2 privacy notes across 2 risk areas. Review closely: credentials & tokens, permissions & scopes.
2 areas
SafetyCredentials & tokensThe command may ask the assistant to inspect authentication metadata and token-flow evidence; do not paste production bearer tokens into the prompt.
SafetyCredentials & tokensTreat missing resource metadata, wrong-audience token acceptance, or token passthrough as blocking findings.
PrivacyPermissions & scopesMetadata and audit output can expose identity providers, scopes, tenant identifiers, redirect URLs, and private server URLs.
PrivacyCredentials & tokensRedact token claims and account identifiers before sharing command output publicly.
Safety notes
The command may ask the assistant to inspect authentication metadata and token-flow evidence; do not paste production bearer tokens into the prompt.
Treat missing resource metadata, wrong-audience token acceptance, or token passthrough as blocking findings.
Privacy notes
Metadata and audit output can expose identity providers, scopes, tenant identifiers, redirect URLs, and private server URLs.
Redact token claims and account identifiers before sharing command output publicly.
Prerequisites
Remote MCP server URL and expected canonical resource URI.
Approved staging credentials or metadata-only access for authorization review.
Permission to inspect HTTP responses, authorization metadata, and token-flow evidence.
Schema details
Install type
cli
Troubleshooting
No
Runtime and command metadata
Command syntax
/mcp-auth-audit <server-url>
Full copyable content
/mcp-auth-audit <server-url>
About this resource
The /mcp-auth-audit command turns the MCP authorization specification into a
repeatable review workflow for remote servers. It is useful before adding a new
MCP endpoint to Claude Code, Cursor, a gateway, or an internal agent platform.
Usage
/mcp-auth-audit
What it does
Captures the unauthenticated 401 challenge and checks whether it advertises
protected resource metadata.
Fetches resource metadata and authorization server metadata.
Checks that the client flow includes the MCP server as the resource.
Reviews audience binding and wrong-audience rejection evidence.
Reviews scopes, redirect handling, dynamic client registration, and error
behavior.
Flags token passthrough or acceptance of tokens issued for another resource.
Produces a public-safe summary plus private evidence handling notes.
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How it compares
/mcp-auth-audit - MCP Authorization Audit Command side by side with 3 alternatives on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.
Next steps differ across entries — use the actions in the table below to copy install commands and source links per resource.
Slash command for auditing a remote MCP server authorization setup, including protected resource metadata, authorization server discovery, OAuth resource indicators, token audience validation, scopes, and token passthrough risk.
✓The command may ask the assistant to inspect authentication metadata and token-flow evidence; do not paste production bearer tokens into the prompt.
Treat missing resource metadata, wrong-audience token acceptance, or token passthrough as blocking findings.
✓This collection is a review workflow, not a guarantee that a remote MCP server is safe to connect to production accounts.
Run write-capable, billing-capable, or deletion-capable MCP tools only in sandboxed accounts until scopes and confirmations are reviewed.
Keep dynamic server inspection separate from source review; both can miss different failure modes.
✓Never send a production user token to an MCP server until the resource metadata and token audience have been verified.
Treat token passthrough, missing resource indicators, or acceptance of tokens issued for another resource as release-blocking.
Do not paste bearer tokens into prompts, PR comments, issue comments, screenshots, or public logs while debugging MCP auth.
✓These rules do not execute the MCP server; they define review requirements before a server is connected to a real account.
A server that accepts wrong-audience tokens, broad scopes, or forwarded user tokens should not be approved until the boundary is corrected.
Use separate runtime testing before trusting any OAuth-backed tool that can write, delete, bill, publish, or modify account data.
Privacy notes
✓Metadata and audit output can expose identity providers, scopes, tenant identifiers, redirect URLs, and private server URLs.
Redact token claims and account identifiers before sharing command output publicly.
✓Authorization metadata, issuer URLs, scopes, endpoint domains, tool names, and inspection traces can expose account architecture.
Do not publish tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, tenant identifiers, private endpoint URLs, or captured tool responses.
✓Authorization metadata can reveal tenant URLs, identity providers, scopes, client registration behavior, and internal endpoint names.
Verification traces may include redirect URLs, state parameters, token claims, account IDs, or workspace identifiers; redact them before public sharing.
✓Authorization metadata, resource identifiers, issuer URLs, scopes, and token-audience notes can reveal account architecture.
Do not paste access tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, or internal tenant identifiers into public review comments.
Prerequisites
Remote MCP server URL and expected canonical resource URI.
Approved staging credentials or metadata-only access for authorization review.
Permission to inspect HTTP responses, authorization metadata, and token-flow evidence.
Remote or local MCP server endpoint, transport, authorization mode, and source repository.
Scope map for account-backed tools and a list of write-capable operations.
Test account or sandbox environment for inspection when the server can mutate data.
Remote MCP server URL and expected canonical resource URI.
OAuth authorization server metadata or discovery endpoint.
Test account or staging credentials approved for metadata and token-flow checks.
Ability to inspect HTTP 401 responses, WWW-Authenticate headers, and token request parameters.
Remote MCP server URL, transport type, and authorization server metadata.
Protected resource metadata discovery path for the exact MCP endpoint.
Scope list, token audience expectations, and tool permission map.