These rules do not execute the MCP server; they define review requirements before a server is connected to a real account., A server that accepts wrong-audience tokens, broad scopes, or forwarded user tokens should not be approved until the boundary is corrected., Use separate runtime testing before trusting any OAuth-backed tool that can write, delete, bill, publish, or modify account data.
Privacy notes
Authorization metadata, resource identifiers, issuer URLs, scopes, and token-audience notes can reveal account architecture., Do not paste access tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, or internal tenant identifiers into public review comments.
Author
JSONbored
Submitted by
JSONbored
Claim status
unclaimed
Last verified
2026-06-05
Decision playbook
Review trust signals before you adopt
Signals are present but mixed. Use the checklist below to confirm the source and operational safety for your environment.
Compare context
Selected
0
Current score
63
Baseline
—
Delta
No baseline selected
No major trust-signal divergence detected in the current selection.
Source and provenance checks
Needs review
Confirm ownership and provenance before trusting install instructions.
Source link availableRequired
Open the canonical repository and verify ownership.
Done
Source provenance statusRequired
Marked as source-backed.
Done
Metadata reviewed
No reviewed flag detected in metadata.
Pending
Safety and privacy checks
Complete
Validate risk disclosures before installation or API wiring.
Safety notes presentRequired
Review the listed safety guidance before running commands.
Done
Privacy notes presentRequired
Review data handling notes before connecting accounts or secrets.
Done
Trust level risk gateRequired
Trust level does not block evaluation.
Done
Package and install checks
Needs review
Check package metadata and artifact integrity signals.
Install payload available
Install or copy payload is available for review.
Done
Package verification flag
No package verification flag provided.
Pending
Checksum metadata
No checksum provided for downloaded artifact.
Pending
Compare-driven decision checks
Needs review
Use compare context to validate trade-offs before adoption.
Compare tray has multiple entries
Add at least one more entry to compare trust differences.
3 safety and 2 privacy notes across 2 risk areas. Review closely: credentials & tokens.
2 areas
SafetyExecution & processesThese rules do not execute the MCP server; they define review requirements before a server is connected to a real account.
SafetyCredentials & tokensA server that accepts wrong-audience tokens, broad scopes, or forwarded user tokens should not be approved until the boundary is corrected.
SafetyCredentials & tokensUse separate runtime testing before trusting any OAuth-backed tool that can write, delete, bill, publish, or modify account data.
PrivacyCredentials & tokensAuthorization metadata, resource identifiers, issuer URLs, scopes, and token-audience notes can reveal account architecture.
PrivacyCredentials & tokensDo not paste access tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, or internal tenant identifiers into public review comments.
Safety notes
These rules do not execute the MCP server; they define review requirements before a server is connected to a real account.
A server that accepts wrong-audience tokens, broad scopes, or forwarded user tokens should not be approved until the boundary is corrected.
Use separate runtime testing before trusting any OAuth-backed tool that can write, delete, bill, publish, or modify account data.
Privacy notes
Authorization metadata, resource identifiers, issuer URLs, scopes, and token-audience notes can reveal account architecture.
Do not paste access tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, or internal tenant identifiers into public review comments.
Prerequisites
Remote MCP server URL, transport type, and authorization server metadata.
Protected resource metadata discovery path for the exact MCP endpoint.
Scope list, token audience expectations, and tool permission map.
Schema details
Install type
copy
Troubleshooting
No
Collection metadata
Estimated setup
15 minutes
Difficulty
intermediate
Full copyable content
Remote MCP authorization review rules:
1. Require protected resource metadata discovery for the MCP endpoint.
2. Require an OAuth resource indicator tied to the exact MCP resource.
3. Reject tokens accepted for the wrong audience or another MCP server.
4. Verify scopes are narrow enough for the advertised tools.
5. Block forwarding incoming user tokens across MCP servers or backend services.
6. Document revocation, refresh, storage, and user consent behavior.
7. Keep source evidence public and credential details private.
About this resource
Purpose
Remote MCP servers can expose account-scoped tools over HTTP transports. These
rules keep review focused on the authorization boundary before the server is
added to Claude or another MCP client. The goal is not to certify the whole
service. The goal is to prevent obvious mistakes: wrong-audience tokens,
missing protected resource metadata, broad scopes, unclear token forwarding, and
unsafe account writes.
Required Evidence
Collect these items before approving the server.
MCP resource URL and transport.
Protected resource metadata URL or discovery path.
Authorization server metadata and issuer.
Required OAuth scopes and their mapped MCP tools.
Expected resource indicator or audience value.
Token storage, refresh, revocation, and logout behavior.
Public source or documentation supporting the implementation.
If the contributor cannot provide the resource metadata, authorization server,
scope map, or public source evidence, mark the submission as incomplete.
Blocking Rules
Reject a remote MCP server that accepts a token minted for another resource.
Reject a server that requires broad account scopes when narrower scopes exist.
Reject forwarding incoming user tokens across MCP servers or backend services;
documentation of a trust boundary is not a substitute for token isolation.
Reject documentation that says "OAuth supported" without showing issuer,
resource, scopes, and consent behavior.
Reject tools that can write account data without explicit safety and privacy
notes.
Reject client setup instructions that ask users to paste tokens into public
files, screenshots, transcripts, or PR comments.
Review Output
Return a concise decision with:
resource metadata status
authorization server status
resource indicator or audience status
scope-to-tool mapping status
token handling status
blocking gaps
safe public wording for any limitations
Authorization Error Status Codes
The specification requires servers to return appropriate HTTP status codes for authorization errors. Confirm the server maps these correctly during review.
Status Code
Description
Usage
401
Unauthorized
Authorization required or token invalid
403
Forbidden
Invalid scopes or insufficient permissions
400
Bad Request
Malformed authorization request
A request without a token, or with an invalid or expired token, must receive an HTTP 401 with a WWW-Authenticate header pointing to the resource metadata URL. An authenticated request carries the token in the Authorization header, never in the URI query string:
GET /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: mcp.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...
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How it compares
MCP Remote Authorization Boundary Rules side by side with 3 alternatives on trust, install, platform support, and disclosed safety notes — all from reviewed registry metadata.
Next steps differ across entries — use the actions in the table below to copy install commands and source links per resource.
Slash command for auditing a remote MCP server authorization setup, including protected resource metadata, authorization server discovery, OAuth resource indicators, token audience validation, scopes, and token passthrough risk.
✓These rules do not execute the MCP server; they define review requirements before a server is connected to a real account.
A server that accepts wrong-audience tokens, broad scopes, or forwarded user tokens should not be approved until the boundary is corrected.
Use separate runtime testing before trusting any OAuth-backed tool that can write, delete, bill, publish, or modify account data.
✓Never send a production user token to an MCP server until the resource metadata and token audience have been verified.
Treat token passthrough, missing resource indicators, or acceptance of tokens issued for another resource as release-blocking.
Do not paste bearer tokens into prompts, PR comments, issue comments, screenshots, or public logs while debugging MCP auth.
✓This collection is a review workflow, not a guarantee that a remote MCP server is safe to connect to production accounts.
Run write-capable, billing-capable, or deletion-capable MCP tools only in sandboxed accounts until scopes and confirmations are reviewed.
Keep dynamic server inspection separate from source review; both can miss different failure modes.
✓The command may ask the assistant to inspect authentication metadata and token-flow evidence; do not paste production bearer tokens into the prompt.
Treat missing resource metadata, wrong-audience token acceptance, or token passthrough as blocking findings.
Privacy notes
✓Authorization metadata, resource identifiers, issuer URLs, scopes, and token-audience notes can reveal account architecture.
Do not paste access tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, or internal tenant identifiers into public review comments.
✓Authorization metadata can reveal tenant URLs, identity providers, scopes, client registration behavior, and internal endpoint names.
Verification traces may include redirect URLs, state parameters, token claims, account IDs, or workspace identifiers; redact them before public sharing.
✓Authorization metadata, issuer URLs, scopes, endpoint domains, tool names, and inspection traces can expose account architecture.
Do not publish tokens, client secrets, refresh tokens, tenant identifiers, private endpoint URLs, or captured tool responses.
✓Metadata and audit output can expose identity providers, scopes, tenant identifiers, redirect URLs, and private server URLs.
Redact token claims and account identifiers before sharing command output publicly.
Prerequisites
Remote MCP server URL, transport type, and authorization server metadata.
Protected resource metadata discovery path for the exact MCP endpoint.
Scope list, token audience expectations, and tool permission map.
Remote MCP server URL and expected canonical resource URI.
OAuth authorization server metadata or discovery endpoint.
Test account or staging credentials approved for metadata and token-flow checks.
Ability to inspect HTTP 401 responses, WWW-Authenticate headers, and token request parameters.
Remote or local MCP server endpoint, transport, authorization mode, and source repository.
Scope map for account-backed tools and a list of write-capable operations.
Test account or sandbox environment for inspection when the server can mutate data.
Remote MCP server URL and expected canonical resource URI.
Approved staging credentials or metadata-only access for authorization review.
Permission to inspect HTTP responses, authorization metadata, and token-flow evidence.